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VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
MECHANISMS: AN OVERVIEW OF COORDINATED AND LIBERAL MARKET 
ECONOMIES 
 
Abstract  
This paper examines those aspects of national institutions that affect corporate governance 
mechanisms at international level. The study uses the “varieties of capitalism” approach 
proposed by Hall and Soskice (2001), and Hall and Gingerich (2009). This approach is 
concerned with the way companies interact strategically to solve the coordination problems 
arising from their activities. This research is based on a sample of countries operating in 
coordinated market economies (CMEs) and liberal market economies (LMEs). The data were 
collected from the Thomson Reuters database. The findings suggest that the institutional 
context is associated with several corporate governance mechanisms. Specifically, our results 
find that the proportion of female directors on boards and the presence of corporate 
governance committees are higher in firms operating in LMEs than in those domiciled in 
CMEs. Regarding the disclosure of corporate social responsibility information, the evidence 
shows that it is not affected by the varieties of capitalism measured, while board-specific 
skills are higher in the latter than in the former. This paper offers empirical evidence at 
international level for the varieties of capitalism that contribute to better corporate governance 
structures. With regard to managerial implications, our findings show that belonging (or not) 
to a specific variety of capitalism impacts various mechanisms of corporate governance.  
 
Keywords: Varieties of capitalism, CSR disclosure, Boards specific skills, corporate 
governance committees 
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1. Introduction  
Corporate governance includes the procedures and processes by which organisations 
are directed and controlled by their CEO, board of directors, and senior management. 
Previous literature (Jensen, 1993; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Bhagat and Bolton, 2008) states 
that the board of directors is an important and effective internal corporate governance 
mechanism, fulfilling two important functions within companies: the supervision of executive 
management on behalf of shareholders, and the provision of business and advisory resources. 
According to Zheka (2005), corporate governance defines the distribution of rights and 
responsibilities among the company’s different stakeholders, and establishes rules and 
procedures for decision-making. Furthermore, it provides structures through which the 
company's objectives are established and supervision is enacted. 
Kiel and Nicholson (2003) suggest that although much of the debate on corporate 
governance and research activity has focused on the United States, in recent years there has 
been an increase in international publications on corporate governance in different countries, 
such as New Zealand, Italy, and the UK (Hossain et al., 2001; Bianco and Casavola, 1999; 
Vafeas and Theodorou, 1998). In addition, corporate governance has been analysed from the 
perspective of different disciplines, such as economics and management, culture and 
sociology, and legal and political paradigms (e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976, Fama, 1980, 
Useem, 1984, Johnson et al., 1996), giving rise to numerous governance theories, with the 
varieties of capitalism being one of them. 
For Hall and Gingerich (2009), the theory on varieties of capitalism assumes that 
companies are the main protagonists of an economy, whose activity is included within 
national economic performance. In order to prosper, companies must engage with other 
players at numerous levels of economic policy. In this sense, Aguilera and Jackson (2003) 
propose a comparative corporate governance model, which suggests that liberal market 
economies (LMEs) differ from coordinated market economies (CMEs) in terms of 
stakeholder salience, emphasising the need to incorporate institutional dimensions into the 
corporate governance field. 
The varieties of capitalism approach (Hall, 2007; Hall and Soskice, 2001, Soskice, 
2007) has been developed in political economics with a view to understanding the 
institutional similarities and differences across the economies of different countries, at the 
same time as it places companies at the heart of the analysis. This approach focuses on 
companies and the manner in which they interact strategically to resolve the coordination 
issues prompted by their activities. This approach thereby seeks to link micro-level aspects 
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related to the rational and strategic behaviour of players and organisations to those at macro-
level related to economic policy and the workings of national institutions. According to Hall 
and Soskice (2001), the varieties of capitalism are focused on the players’ strategic 
interactions, and the ways in which they are conditioned by the different institutions with 
which they interact. This approach considers that the different forms adopted by capitalist 
systems may be differentiated by the manner in which the social partners and institutional 
systems are structured in each particular context. The different institutional systems are 
mainly the outcome of political commitments. According to Hartmann and Uhlenbruck 
(2015), this approach seeks to explain why and how legal, market and social institutions shape 
companies’ behaviour and performance. Whenever governments differ in their policies on 
these issues, we may therefore expect that this will probably lead to differences in firm 
performance.  
In short, we may establish that varieties of capitalism divide some advanced 
economies into liberal and coordinated market economies, based on the allocative mechanism 
of resources, profits and risk. Coordinated market economies (CMEs) are focused toward 
stakeholders, while liberal market economies (LMEs) lean toward shareholders. CMEs 
involve major state control and are influenced by organisations such as employee associations 
and labour organisations (Kang and Moon, 2012), whereas LMEs involve countries 
characterised by a major market prevalence, prioritising the rights of shareholders and 
lenders, with less emphasis on the role played by other stakeholders (Aguilera and Jackson, 
2003). 
Considering the above arguments, the aim here is to analyse at international level how 
aspects of institutional environments are associated with various mechanisms of corporate 
governance. CMEs and LMEs are similar in some aspects of corporate governance 
mechanisms, but they also differ in others. This paper therefore focuses on these differences, 
and we particularly analyse the following corporate governance mechanisms: corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) disclosure as a dimension of corporate governance, board-specific skills, 
the number of female directors on corporate boards, and corporate governance committees. 
As regards CSR disclosure as a dimension of corporate governance, the shareholder and 
stakeholder orientations are the ones predicting that managers conduct CSR to fulfil their 
moral, ethical, and social duties to their stakeholders, and strategically achieve corporate 
objectives for the company’s shareholders. As Desender and Epure (2015) argue, in the 
shareholder model, also referred to as market-oriented, the interactions are transactional in 
nature. By contrast, the stakeholder-focused system, also referred to as the internal model, is 
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based on banks or credit-based financing, and involves debt financing and closely 
interconnected relational networks across companies, their trading partners, and financial 
institutions. In this regard, we predict that CSR disclosure will be different between CMEs 
and LMEs because the former focus more on stakeholders and the latter do so more on 
shareholders.  
Regarding board-specific skills, the nature of the educational system and labour 
market are the determinants of these skills in the different contextual dimensions of varieties 
of capitalism. Matten and Moon (2008) therefore contend that Europe and the US differ in 
those aspects related to human resources in school education and in public policies on training 
and the labour market. Accordingly, we posit that board-specific skills are a priority in CMEs, 
because these skills serve industries and companies in the long term. 
Regarding the presence of female directors on boards, cultural factors help us to find 
differences between LMEs and CMEs. Liberal economies (LMEs) will be more inclined to 
regulate or support the presence of women on corporate boards, as countries within this 
context are more feminist and open-minded. Mandel and Shalev (2009) therefore indicate that 
female professionals and managers in LMEs are better able to compete with men for top-tier 
jobs and generous remuneration than in CMEs. Terjesen and Singh (2008) also affirm that the 
proportion of female managers has improved over time in LME countries, such as the US and 
UK. Thus, according to prior research, it seems that LME countries tend to support more 
board gender diversity than their CME counterparts. The cultural differences between CMEs 
and LMEs may result in boards with higher or lower percentages of women directors. 
As regards corporate governance committees, the laws, recommendations and issues 
related to corporate governance mechanisms will be more developed in LMEs, where the 
financing by the capital market prevails. This is because capital markets are financed by 
different investors, which means companies need to have corporate governance mechanisms 
in place to safeguard the rights and interests of shareholders and investors. Companies in 
these economies will be more inclined to implement these corporate governance mechanisms, 
such as a corporate governance committee, because if they fail to do so they might be 
penalised by capital markets (Ioannou and Serafeim, 2012; Aguilera and Jackson, 2003). In 
contrast, CMEs are more bank-oriented systems, and firms usually obtain funds from 
financial institutions and less so from capital markets. Firms are therefore less exposed to 
public and market scrutiny, and might feel under less pressure to create corporate governance 
committees. These differences also lead us to analyse whether it is more likely that corporate 
governance committees will be introduced in LMEs or in CMEs.  
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In this regard, we explain cross-national diversity in corporate governance by 
specifying and integrating the various institutional mechanisms shaping stakeholders' roles at 
firm level (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003). Specifically, we consider varieties of capitalism 
proposed by Hall and Soskice (2001) and Hall and Gingerich (2009).  
This paper thus extends the debate outlined above and contributes to the existing 
literature in several ways. Firstly, it uses an unbalanced panel dataset of 10,043 company-year 
observations from 16 countries during the period 2004–2015. This is in contrast to previous 
studies that focus mainly on specific time periods and on a restricted sample of companies 
operating in specific countries, such as Australia, Japan, and the UK (Kiel and Nicholson, 
2003; Ullah, 2017; Weir and Laing, 2001; Chen et al., 2015). Moreover, the availability of 
data from multiple countries adds special interest to our research because it allows the 
analysis to be extended to a broader point of reference than the corporate system addressed by 
most existing studies. Secondly, this research contributes to existing knowledge on the 
influence of different institutional contexts according to the following corporate governance 
attributes: CSR disclosure as a dimension of corporate governance, board-specific skills, 
female directors on corporate boards, and corporate governance committees. Thus, our 
reference involves those perspectives on varieties of capitalism not often considered in 
previous research (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Jackson and Apostolakou, 2010). This explains 
the variations and changes that exist within capitalist systems through a broad dichotomy of 
institutional contexts in both liberal and coordinated economies. Thirdly, our evidence shows 
that in contrast to past research, the likelihood of disclosing CSR information is the same in 
CMEs and LMEs. It was expected to be higher in CMEs than in LMEs, but the findings report 
that CSR reporting is not affected by the varieties of capitalism involved. Fourthly, our results 
support the paper’s initial thesis whereby companies belonging to a specific context are 
homogeneous and adopt the same model of corporate governance. This evidence may be due 
to the fact that we analyse different aspects of corporate governance within the framework of 
varieties of capitalism, as Hall and Gingerich (2009) suggest that the organisations operating 
under the same institutional environment are pressured to behave similarly. This leads 
companies (belonging to a specific context) to become homogeneous and adopt the same 
model of corporate governance. Finally, the further contribution to past empirical evidence 
involves using board-specific skills as a dependent variable. To our knowledge, no preceding 
research has analysed this variable within the framework of varieties of capitalism. 
The paper is structured as follows. Following this introduction, the theoretical 
framework and hypotheses are provided in the second section. The empirical design is 
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presented in the third section, where the sample and variables are described. Our findings are 
analysed in the fourth section. The discussion is presented in the fifth section, drawing the 
conclusions and implications derived from our analysis. 
 
2. Theoretical framework and research hypotheses 
Varieties of capitalism theory assumes that companies are the economy’s main 
players, with their performance going hand-in-hand with the country’s overall economic 
performance. In order to prosper, companies need to engage with other players in multiple 
spheres of economic policies (Hall and Gingerich, 2009). The varieties of capitalism 
perspective was developed at the end of the 1990s within the field of political economics to 
compare economies of different countries, whilst simultaneously placing companies at the 
heart of the analysis. This perspective is mainly concerned with analysing how companies 
behave and interact within a particular institutional structure (Hall, 2007; Hall and Soskice, 
2001; Soskice, 2007). This theory is therefore closely aligned with companies and how they 
interact strategically to solve the coordination problems that emerge because of their 
activities. According to Hall and Soskice (2006), the actions of organisations are defined by 
their relationships with other players, generating stable patterns that make up a certain 
political economy or variety of capitalism. It is important to note that the term player is used 
to refer to individuals, groups, and organisations that interact to produce certain results. In this 
regard, Amaeshi and Amao (2009, p. 227) consider that ‘the varieties of capitalism of 
comparative business systems, for instance, offer an analytical framework for understanding 
the political economy of firm's behaviour and performance’. 
The main academic emphasis in this field lies in the distinctive nature of national 
institutional contexts, where companies operate within different spheres and are subject to the 
influence of other social networks, such as unions and regulatory authorities. Thus, the 
institutional contexts within the system of varieties of capitalism is focused on CMEs and 
LMEs (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Vitols, 2001; Hancke et al., 2007; Amable, 2003). 
In LMEs, the rights of shareholders and creditors are prioritised over other 
stakeholders. Furthermore, this type of economy is characterised by market dominance and a 
notion of ownership rights (Hall and Gingerich, 2009). In CMEs, the government prevails, 
and the interests of organisations such as business associations and trade unions play an 
important role (Kang and Moon, 2012). Countries operating in CMEs are socially oriented 
and focus on satisfying the needs of a wide range of stakeholders, such as employees, 
suppliers, and shareholders (Dore, 2000; Hall and Gingerich, 2009).  
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However, the theory on varieties of capitalism is based on different contextual 
dimensions: the role of the state in the economy, the type and development of financial 
markets, and the nature of the educational system and labour market (Whitley, 1999). 
Regarding the first dimension, the role of the state in the economy, Carney and Witt (2012), 
Whitley (2005) and Fainshmidt et al. (2018) suggest that the state wields its influence over a 
country’s economy in three different ways: directly, as it is actively and directly involved in 
economic output through state-owned companies, indirectly, through the provision of capital, 
favouritism, or involvement in corporate governance, and through the general approach it 
adopts toward the nation’s economic life. Regarding the different models of state, we may 
highlight the LME and CME countries under study here. On the one hand, the regulatory state 
is responsible for drafting and laying down the rules of the game and, in particular, the 
protection of ownership rights, with the US being a clear example of an LME country. 
Another type of economy would be the welfare state, where more importance is given to the 
protection and promotion of its citizens’ economic and social wellbeing, mainly through the 
state’s redistribution of wealth (Northern European countries are typical examples of CMEs). 
Regarding the second dimension, which refers to the role of financial markets, capital 
providers are key players for organisations, as they finance commercial operations (Freeman 
et al., 2007) and investment, and therefore have an impact on firms’ development and 
survival. In some LME countries, such as the US, the financial system is based on the capital 
market, which is the main source of funding for firms. This is because firms obtain their 
capital from the corresponding stock market, and the investment is relatively dispersed among 
shareholders. Firms therefore have to ensure a high degree of transparency and accountability 
for investors (Ioannou and Serafeim, 2012; Aguilera and Jackson, 2003). Another 
arrangement is the credit-based or bank-based financial system. A bank-based financial 
system is one in which financial institutions are crucial for marshalling household deposits 
and channelling them directly into business loans (e.g., Germany and France are CME 
countries). Besides the close ties between banks and industrial corporations, these systems 
tend to have small and weakly developed capital markets that make firms more dependent on 
borrowing. Financing through bank loans involves both a strict supervision of capital and 
contingency planning, which leads to long-term capital commitment. This therefore means 
that “financial systems influence corporate governance through their capacity to provide 
different sources of capital and to affect the relationship with the firm” (Aguilera and Jackson, 
2003, 454). 
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Anther contextual dimension that differs between an LME and a CME is the nature of 
the educational system and labour market. Matten and Moon (2008) contend that Europe and 
the US differ in those aspects related to human resources in school education. Moreover, they 
affirm that public policies on training and the labour market have been put in place in Europe 
in which organisations have taken part according to the different regulations and customs that 
exist, whereas in the US it has been an area in which companies themselves have developed 
their own strategies. At the same time, European organisations have shown a greater 
propensity to pursue collective interests through national business associations or federations. 
This associative power can therefore exert pressure to obtain greater benefits for employees, 
focusing more on health and safety provisions, progressive policies in industrial relations, and 
more workplace services, and may lobby for greater community involvement. This labour 
strength may even raise general awareness within society by acting as an ambassador for a 
firm’s environmental and social policies. Thus, as Hall and Gingerich (2009) demonstrate, 
when labour relations are based on strong unions and coordinated wage negotiations, it is 
more efficient for companies to operate collaborative training schemes that confer a high level 
of industry-specific skills. In sum, the level of the labour market within a national context is 
important because it determines how organizations engage with employees in productive 
activities. For instance, when knowledge capital is collectively available to firms within an 
economy, organisations may invest in firm-specific skills (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003), 
whereas a scarcity of knowledge capital may reduce incentives to invest in particular 
capabilities and even sectors. 
Besides the above aspects, the shareholder and stakeholder orientations should be 
considered within our theoretical frameworks, for as Desender and Epure (2015) posit, in the 
shareholder model (LME), also referred to as market-oriented, interactions are transactional in 
nature. This model is based on the market’s strength for the proper allocation of resources 
within firms, and is based on extremely powerful incentives and external control systems for 
supervising managers and aligning their interests. According to Kang and Moon (2012), 
companies identified by this variety of capitalism focus on the interests of investors and 
managers as key players. By contrast, the system focusing on stakeholders (CME), also 
referred to as the internal, bank-based or credit-based financial model, involves debt financing 
and closely interconnected relational networks across companies, trade partners and financial 
institutions. Moreover, as Kang and Moon (2012) suggest, it is important for companies and 
economic agents in CMEs to maintain social cohesion, with labour and employee rights being 
a priority  
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Within this conceptual framework of varieties of capitalism, considering different 
institutional contexts and the shareholder and stakeholder orientations, this study explores 
whether operating in either an LME or a CME country has an impact on a company’s 
implementation of the following corporate governance mechanisms: CSR disclosure, board-
specific skills, female directors on boards, and corporate governance committees.  
 
2.1. CSR disclosure 
According to Jamali (2006), CSR is a concept that attracts worldwide attention, 
acquiring new resonance in the global market. Regarding its relationship with corporate 
governance, Jamali et al. (2008, p. 447) suggest three models that postulate a relationship 
between corporate governance and CSR: (1) corporate governance as a pillar for CSR, (2) 
CSR as a dimension of corporate governance, and (3) corporate governance and CSR as part 
of a continuum. For the purpose of this research, we draw upon the second model proposed 
(CSR as a dimension of corporate governance), because the objective is to analyse various 
corporate governance mechanisms, and CSR can be considered one of them. In addition, as 
indicated by Jensen (2002) and Aguilera et al. (2007), both corporate governance and CSR are 
manifestations of companies’ fiduciary and moral responsibilities towards stakeholders. 
Managers’ attitudes toward CSR practices may be affected by a country’s shareholder or 
stakeholder orientation. Managers interested in showing their ethical, moral and social duties 
toward their stakeholders will be more likely to engage with CSR matters, in line with 
countries where stakeholder orientation prevails. However, this commitment to CSR policies 
will be lower if managers are willing to fulfil more shareholder aims and needs than 
stakeholder demands, consistent with contexts with a higher shareholder orientation. LME 
countries are more oriented toward shareholders (market-oriented model) and the interactions 
are transactional in nature (Desender and Epure, 2015). By contrast, CME contexts are 
oriented toward stakeholders and are based on the credit-based model and involve debt 
financing.  
Using the framework of varieties of capitalism, various studies have focused on 
analysing how CMEs and LMEs influence CSR disclosure. Authors such as Kang and Moon 
(2012) suggest that it is important for companies and economic agents in CMEs to maintain 
social cohesion—with labour and employee rights being a priority—with strong pressure to 
perform CSR practices (Aguilera et al., 2007; Campbell, 2007). Consequently, CSR 
disclosure aims to maintain the social order or the status quo necessary to sustain the business 
by establishing relationships among different stakeholders (Brammer et al., 2012; Favotto et 
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al., 2016). Therefore, in CMEs, companies use CSR disclosure as a form of dialogue with 
stakeholders, and include stakeholders in the process of obtaining and communicating 
information. In sum, CMEs recognise that stakeholders play an important role. Moreover, as 
Kang and Moon (2012) state, in CMEs priority is given to essential issues such as economic 
development, frequently related to labour issues. 
In contrast, LMEs are traditionally characterised by a market-based economy with 
corporate responsibility oriented primarily towards shareholders (Vitols, 2001). In these 
countries, the financial system (based on the stock market) and labour relations (based on 
contracts) create a national system of corporate governance characterised by the value of the 
shareholders (Vitols, 2001). In LMEs, management is particularly sensitive to the demands of 
shareholders, given the strong dependence on the stock market as a means of financing 
business. Therefore, the value of shareholders increasingly replaces the public value of 
companies, and many governance mechanisms depend on the market. In addition, such 
countries come under the common law classification made by La Porta et al. (1998), and 
focus on shareholder protection and creditor rights, while giving less importance to the role of 
other stakeholder groups. According to Kang and Moon (2012), companies identified by this 
variety of capitalism focus on the interests of investors and managers as key players. 
Aguilera and Jackson (2003) suggest that trade or employee associations and 
institutionalised dialogue with stakeholders lead to greater emphasis on the presentation of 
CSR disclosure. In addition, according to Campbell (2007), companies are more likely to 
adopt socially responsible practices if they participate in a dialogue with employees, unions, 
communities, investors, and other stakeholders in the company. 
Therefore, according to the above arguments, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
Hypothesis 1: CSR disclosure is higher in coordinated market economies than in 
liberal market economies. 
2.2. Board-specific skills  
According to Hillman et al. (2000), the term board-specific skills refers to board 
members who have an industry-specific background and are considered business experts. 
Thus, business experts are those board members who have knowledge based on their previous 
experience and are more effective, providing companies with resources in the form of skills, 
knowledge, experience, legitimacy, reputation, and the ability to achieve commitment and 
links between companies and stakeholders (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). According to 
Wincent et al. (2010) and Johnson et al. (2013), this human and social capital comes from 
education, knowledge, and the experience acquired by these directors outside the company,  
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Finegold and Soskice (1988) state that when considering different institutional 
contexts of varieties of capitalism, there are significant differences in economies that can 
influence business experts and, therefore, also the board members of the different companies 
belonging to these institutional contexts. Thus, and according to Matten and Moon (2008), the 
labour market and the nature of the educational system describe board-specific skills in the 
different contextual dimensions of varieties of capitalism. Matten and Moon (2008) also 
identify systems for developing and supervising board-specific skills: the education system is 
the one that develops and certifies competencies and skills, and the labour market involves the 
institutions that control the terms under which these markets are organised. Along these same 
lines, these authors identify different aspects related to human resources in education and in 
the public policies on training and the labour market that make Europe and the US different. 
For example, higher levels of membership of labour organisations in Europe (mostly CME 
countries) than in the US (LME country) which is to the advantage of employees. 
Furthermore, CME countries consider skills to be assets that are invested and used by 
multiple players, such as business associations and labour organisations that belong to many 
different economic sectors.  
According to Hall and Soskice (2003), there are differences between the educational 
systems of both LMEs and CMEs. In general terms, these differences can be summarised 
thus: in LMEs, most training and development initiatives at various levels are designed to 
develop general skills, while company specific skills are in greater demand in CMEs. More 
specifically, in LME countries (e.g., the United States) the nature of the labour force is subject 
to a high turnover, and companies are more likely to hesitate to commit to a higher level of 
expenditure for recruitment, development, and training purposes. This is because companies 
in such countries fear training their workforce, as they will leave their jobs for competitor 
companies in search of better opportunities. Consequently, educational institutions in these 
countries organise courses that offer more generic skills that can be applied to a wide range of 
industries and companies.  
By contrast, the development of company-specific skills is a priority in CMEs, 
because these skills serve industries and companies in the long term. Thus, as Hall and 
Gingerich (2009) shoe, when labour relations are based on strong unions and coordinated 
wage negotiations, it is more efficient for companies to operate collaborative training schemes 
that confer a high level of industry-specific skills. The high wages established at industry 
level encourage workers to acquire certain skills specific to each industry. This makes it more 
difficult for less-prepared companies to hire workers from other companies by offering them 
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premium salaries. This in turn encourages workers to remain in the same workplace for longer 
periods of time (Bosch and Charest, 2008). As indicated, it seems that in CMEs there are 
more specific skills programmes targeting the labour market than in LMEs and—by 
extension—board members in CMEs are more likely to have specific skills, such as industry-
specific skills. 
Hence, these arguments lead us to propose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: Board-specific skills are higher in countries domiciled in coordinated 
market economies than in liberal market economies. 
 
2.3. Female directors on corporate boards 
There is an increasing number of studies analysing the relevance of female board 
directors. This is because it has been demonstrated that their presence can improve financial 
reporting quality, and the promotion of good business practices and strategic decisions for 
companies (Pucheta-Martínez et al., 2016; Rogelberg and Rumery, 1996).  
In the context of varieties of capitalism, it is necessary to explore the influence that 
this economic system may have on the presence of women on boards because it can differ 
depending on whether a company is located in a CME country or an LME country. Further, it 
should be taken into account that each one presents different peculiarities. In this regard, 
considering more liberal mindsets, cultural factors, and bearing in mind the role of women in 
society, it is more likely to find women directors on boards in LME contexts. Past research 
(Terjesen and Singh, 2008) shows that LME countries such as the UK and the US have 
increased the number of women managers in firms in recent years within the framework of 
the varieties of capitalism. This may also be due to the scandals over corporate governance 
triggered by Enron, WorldCom and Parmalat, which have led to a new set of regulations (e.g., 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act; the Combined Code) in relation to corporate board structures, 
processes, duties and responsibility, including the recommendation to have more women on 
boards. There are cultural and legal differences between LMEs and CMEs, which might alter 
the presence of female directors on boards in one or other type of countries, with a higher 
presence to be expected in LMEs than in CMEs. 
According to Hall and Soskice (2001), examples of countries with CMEs include 
Germany, Switzerland, and Belgium. In these countries, most companies offer training 
programmes in order to provide skills to workers and guarantee them specific positions (Dore, 
2000; Hall and Gingerich, 2009). Therefore, these countries are characterised by strong labour 
relations, broad professional training, and solid business networks. Authors such as Estevez-
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Abe (2005, 2006) consider that these characteristics of CMEs do not contribute to the 
ambitions that women may have in management positions, in particular because of the close 
relationship between companies and workers through the professional training that workers 
receive, or due to their unemployment benefits. All this makes investment in specific skills 
more feasible than in other countries such as the US, the UK and Australia—countries that 
Hall and Soskice (2001) denote as LMEs. In these countries, the market plays a decisive role 
in the balance of labour relations, trade is based mainly on contracts, and extensive 
collaborations within the industry are replaced by competition. In addition, business 
associations in these countries are weak, and companies lack the capacity to develop training 
programmes in order to provide workers with specific skills. Therefore, the acquisition of 
skills by workers is more general. 
Mandel and Shalev (2009) claim that the variety of capitalism perspective is more 
suitable for more clearly understanding the position of women directors in LMEs. In this kind 
of liberal economy, neutral positions tend to be adopted in regard to both gender roles in the 
labour market, and the division of responsibilities in relation to the work-family dichotomy. 
In this type of countries, women are freer to compete with men for the highest positions. 
According to Mandel and Semyonov (2006), prior evidence on the success of women in 
senior positions shows that the progress of women (in both management positions and board 
membership) has been more significant in liberal economies like the US. In this sense, 
Grosvold and Brammer (2011) consider that there is a higher prevalence of women on boards 
in LMEs than in other countries, and so based on the above arguments, we propose the 
following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: The proportion of female directors on boards is higher in liberal market 
economies than in coordinated market economies. 
2.4. Corporate governance committee 
Corporate governance committees are control mechanisms, different from the board of 
directors. These committees assist boards to carry out their activities in an efficient and 
independent manner (Harrison, 1987; Tao and Hutchinson, 2013), in such a way that the main 
decisions taken by the boards of directors are sometimes actually circulated from the 
corporate governance committees (Andrews, 1997). 
According to Harrison (1987), corporate governance committees are mechanisms for 
monitoring management, protecting the interests of shareholders and, additionally, serve 
strategic purposes for companies, such as maintaining corporate legitimacy and contributing 
to the formulation of corporate strategies. However, there may be additional reasons for 
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companies to have different committees, such as reducing the workload, or providing various 
solutions to critical problems (Johanson and Østergren, 2010). Moreover, the most effective 
use of corporate governance committees can lead to more responsible behaviour by boards 
and strong protection of shareholder’s interests.  
In the case of corporate governance committees, companies operating in LMEs (where 
shareholder protection is important) are more likely to implement such committees. Chizema 
and Shinozawa (2012) indicate that the existence of committees is common practice in 
English-speaking countries within their particular style of corporate governance, oriented 
toward the shareholder value model (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003; Yoshikawa et al., 2007). 
The importance for companies in these liberal economies (LMEs) of implementing corporate 
governance mechanisms, such as a corporate governance committee, lies in the fact that if 
they fail to do so, they run the risk of being penalised by the capital markets (Ioannou and 
Serafeim, 2012; Aguilera and Jackson, 2003). Companies operating in LME contexts borrow 
mainly from capital markets, which means the regulators in these companies legislate and 
recommend in relation to corporate governance mechanisms, as these will enable companies 
to administer and manage themselves more efficiently. On the other hand, firms domiciled in 
CME countries operate in bank-oriented systems and, therefore, banks are obviously their 
main financial source. These differences induce us to consider and analyse whether there a 
greater likelihood of more corporate governance committees being set up in LME countries 
than in CME ones. 
According to the Cadbury Report (1992), one of the reasons for introducing board 
committees in English-speaking countries was to reduce the influence executive directors 
have on decisions, where independence is considered a highly relevant and crucial issue. 
Another reason for the formation of a committee is that it is considered vital for the board to 
fulfil its duties (Huang et al., 2012). Thus, according to the above arguments, we propose the 
following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4: The presence of corporate governance committees is higher in liberal 
market economies than in coordinated market economies. 
 
3. Empirical Design 
3.1. Sample 
The initial sample for the panel data examination was composed of 13,178 
observations collected from 2005 to 2015 (inclusive). All financial companies were excluded 
from the initial sample because they comply with specific accounting rules, which makes it 
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more difficult to compare annual financial statements between non-financial and financial 
companies. Furthermore, all those companies missing data on some variables were excluded. 
Thus, the final sample consisted of 10,043 international companies, building an unbalanced 
panel data sample. Nevertheless, as Arellano (2003) supports, these panels are as trustworthy 
and consistent as balanced panel data. The Thomson Reuters database was used to provide 
information on corporate governance, CSR, board attributes, and economic and financial 
information.  
As the study differentiates between LME and CME, companies from 16 countries 
formed the sample according to this classification. The countries with LMEs were Australia, 
Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, the UK, and the US, while the CME countries were Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and 
Switzerland (Hall and Soskice, 2001). 
Table 1 provides the number of observations by country (and their percentages) for the 
total sample. As is evident, the country with least representation in the sample is Austria (with 
34 observations) and the country with the highest is the US (with 3,581). 
<Insert Table 1> 
Table 2 illustrates the sector classification used in this analysis, based on the Thomson 
Reuters Business Classification (TRBC) provided by Thomson Reuters. As is evident from 
the data in Table 2, the sample comprised nine activity sectors. Companies belonging to the 
industrial sector represent 21.6%, followed by the consumer cyclical and commodities sectors 
at 19.90% and 13.80%, respectively. The sector with the lowest representation was 
telecommunications services at 3.3%.  
<Insert Table 2> 
 
3.2. Dependent variables 
Four different dependent variables were used, based on the corporate governance field. 
The first dependent variable, CSR disclosure as a dimension of corporate governance 
(CSR_DISC), was calculated by using a multidimensional construct, which allowed all social 
and environmental items disclosed by a company to be considered (Rupp and Mallory, 2015). 
Particularly, an index was constructed by aggregating all the items disclosed by companies on 
environmental and social matters, out of a total of 112 items analysed. If the company 
disclosed one item, then a value of 1 is added, and 0 otherwise (Gallego-Álvarez and Ortas, 
2017). The environmental items were focused on innovation, resource use, and emissions, 
while the social items refer to four fields: human rights, product responsibility, workforce, 
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and community. The second dependent variable was board-specific skills, denoted by 
B_SPECI_SKILLS, representing the percentage of board members with an industry-specific 
background (Ramón-Llorens et al., 2018). The third dependent variable used was the 
proportion of female board directors, labelled as WBOARD. This variable was measured as 
the ratio of the total number of women board directors to the total overall number of directors 
on boards (Terjesen and Singh, 2008; Grosvold and Brammer, 2011). The last dependent 
variable used was the existence of a corporate governance committee, referred to as 
CG_COMMT, and computed as a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm has a 
committee, and 0 otherwise (Mallin and Michelon, 2011).  
 
3.3. Independent variables 
The independent variable was defined as either LME or CME, calculated as a dummy 
variable that takes the value 1 if the country is located in an LME, and 0 when the country is 
domiciled in a CME (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Hall and Soskice, 2006; Gallego-Álvarez and 
Quina-Custodio, 2017).  
 
3.4. Control variables 
A review of past empirical research allowed considering several control variables in 
this analysis. The board size (BODSIZE)—in line with Sauerwald et al. (2016) and De 
Andrés et al. (2017)—was calculated as the total number of directors on boards. The second 
control variable was company performance, proxied with Tobin’s Q (García-Ramos et al., 
2017) and denoted by Q_TOBIN. This variable was measured as the market capitalisation of 
common stock+book value liabilities divided by the book value of total assets. Furthermore, 
CEO power was also controlled. This variable is denoted by CEO_POW and is calculated as 
the aggregation of four dummy variables, in line with earlier research (Tien et al., 2014; Koo, 
2015). These are: (1) CEO duality, which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the 
same person serves simultaneously as CEO and chairman of the board, and 0 otherwise, (2) if 
the chairman of the board is an ex-CEO, which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if 
the chairman of the board held the CEO position in the company prior to becoming chairman 
and, 0 otherwise, (3) CEO tenure, which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if CEO 
tenure is above the sample median, and 0 otherwise, and (4) if the CEO is a board member, 
which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the CEO serves as a board member, but 
not as chair of the board, and 0 otherwise. Company size (SIZE), was also controlled for, 
measured as the log of sales (Thomsen et al., 2016; García-Meca and Palacio, 2018). 
17 
Leverage was defined as LEVERAGE, calculated as debt over total assets (Rees and 
Rodionova, 2015). The measure of industry sector was based on the paper by Gallego-
Álvarez and Quina-Custodio (2017), which created nine dummy variables in the analysis 
representing the following activities: commodities, consumer cyclical, consumer non-cyclical, 
energy, healthcare, industrial, technology, telecommunications services, and utilities. These 
were based on the TRBC economic classification provided by Thomson Reuters. Finally, the 
effects of sector (SECTOR) and year (YEAR) were controlled for by considering a set of 
dummy variables in the model. Table 3 presents the summary of the dependent, independent, 
and control variables. 
<Insert Table 3 > 
Thus, we have built four baseline models to verify the proposed hypotheses: 
 
MODEL 1:  CSR_DISCit = β0 + β1 LMEit+ β2 BODSIZEit+ β3 TOBIN_Qit+ β4 
CEO_POWit+ β5 SIZEit+ β6 LEVERAGEit+ ∑ βk SECTORi +∑ βj YEARt + Ʊit + φi  
MODEL 2:  B_SPECI_SKILLS it = β0 + β1 LMEit+ β2 BODSIZEit+ β3 TOBIN_Qit+ β4 
CEO_POWit+ β5 SIZEit+ β6 LEVERAGEit+ ∑ βk SECTORi +∑ βj YEARt + Ʊit + φi 
MODEL 3:  WBOARDit = β0 + β1 LMEit+ β2 BODSIZEit+ β3 TOBIN_Qit+ β4 
CEO_POWit+ β5 SIZEit+ β6 LEVERAGEit+ ∑ βk SECTORi +∑ βj YEARt + Ʊit + φi 
MODEL 4:  CG_COMMTit = β0 + β1 LMEit+ β2 BODSIZEit+ β3 TOBIN_Qit+ β4 
CEO_POWit+ β5 SIZEit+ β6 LEVERAGEit+ ∑ βk SECTORi +∑ βj YEARt + Ʊit + φi 
 
where all the variables included have an "i" subscript, which refers the company, and 
"t" represents the year. Moreover, β0 is the intercept and β1… βn are the regression 
coefficients. The random error term (Ʊit + φi) can be separated into two components: the 
disturbance term, Ʊit, varying the cross-section and cross-time combined effect, and the 
individual or company-specific effect, φi (the unobservable heterogeneity), which is invariant 
over time and varies among individuals (Greene, 1998).  
The dynamic panel data estimator of the generalised method of moments (GMM) 
proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998) was used. Different to 
other estimators, the GMM procedure is consistent and efficient because it deals with 
unobservable heterogeneity (φi) by modelling it as an individual effect, and by eliminating it 
with the first differences in variables. The dynamics of the procedure are controlled with the 
dynamic panel data method by lagging the dependent variable (introducing temporal 
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dependency). Additionally, the GMM procedure also takes into account the endogeneity, and 
reduces the estimation bias.  
The GMM procedure offers the Arellano–Bond tests AR(1) and AR(2), and the 
Hansen test. The Arellano-Bond test AR(2) enables the analysis to show whether there is a 
second-order serial correlation in the first difference residuals. The second-order serial 
correlation will not be a concern if the null hypothesis of non-serial correlation is rejected 
(p>0.1). Additionally, the Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions will confirm whether the 
instruments used in the estimation are suitable by rejecting (p > 0.1) the null hypothesis of 
non-correlation between the instruments and the error term. 
 
4. Results  
4.1. Descriptive analysis  
Table 4 reports the main descriptive statistics for all variables. Concerning the 
dependent variables, the companies in our sample disclosed, on average, 28.08 items out of 
112; the percentage of board members with an industry-specific background (board specific 
skills) was, on average, 57.89%, the proportion of female directors on boards (WBOARD) 
was, on average, 12.50%, whilst 53.43% of the companies have a corporate governance 
committee (CG_COMMT). Additionally, 70.17% of the companies in the sample operated in 
an LME. With respect to company characteristics, the average board size was 10.44 members, 
company performance measured with Tobin’s Q was 0.72, CEO power was, on average, 1.64, 
company size was 9.61 (log of sales) and leverage was, on average, 11.05%. Finally, 13.75% 
of the companies in the sample belong to the commodities sector, 19.92% to consumer 
cyclicals, 9.98% to consumer non-cyclical, 8.66% to energy, 8.92% to healthcare, 21.65% to 
industrials, 8.73% to technology, 3.30% to telecommunication services, and 5.10% to utilities. 
<Insert Table 4> 
A correlation matrix has been built to check for multicollinearity. The correlation 
coefficients reported in Table 5 were lower than 0.8 (see Archambeault and DeZoort, 2001), 
whereby we may conclude that multicollinearity is not a concern in our research. Moreover, 
the variance inflation factors (VIFs) have also been calculated. None (as shown in Table 5) is 
higher than 10. VIFs that exceed values of 10 reveal multicollinearity problems (Greene, 
1998; O’Brien, 2007). Thus, multicollinearity is not a concern in our research.  
<Insert Table 5> 
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4.2. Multivariate analysis 
Table 6 presents the results of the regressions run to test the hypotheses posited. Four 
different models were run. In Model 1, we explored whether CSR disclosure would be lower 
in LMEs than in CMEs. The variable LME had a positive sign, contrary to our predictions, 
but was not statistically significant, which led us to reject the first hypothesis. This finding 
shows that companies operating in LMEs are equally likely to disclose CSR information as 
those operating in CMEs, although most previous research suggests that CSR disclosure is 
higher in CME countries (e.g., Aguilera and Jackson, 2010; Brammer et al., 2012; Favotto et 
al., 2016). This evidence supports the view that CSR reporting is not influenced by varieties 
of capitalism, which is also contrary to what some scholars (i.e., Kinderman, 2012) argue, 
namely, that there is a higher development of CSR practices and institutions in LMEs because 
they may substitute the lack of extensive public regulation, and might provide companies with 
a source of legitimacy “in countries where the state only minimally compensates those not 
well served by the market” (Favotto et al., 2016, p. 14). Thus, our findings show that past 
evidence on the higher level of CSR disclosure in CMEs countries is not conclusive, and there 
is therefore a need to shed new light on this topic by considering not only CSR reporting as a 
whole, but also by separately analysing the different dimensions of CSR, such as human 
rights and environmental and social issues, to explore how they are affected by varieties of 
capitalism.  
<Insert Table 6> 
Model 2 examined whether board-specific skills—measured as the percentage of 
board members who have an industry-specific background—were lower in LMEs than in 
CMEs. The result for LMEs was negative and significantly related to the dependent variable 
board-specific skills. Thus, the percentage of board members with an industry-specific 
background is lower in LMEs than in CMEs, and hypothesis 2 cannot therefore be rejected. 
This result is consistent with Hall and Gingerich (2009), Schneider (2009), and Kiran (2018), 
who support the view that labour relations in CMEs are characterised by coordinated wage-
bargaining, high levels of employment protection, and strong unions, which allow companies 
to confer high levels of industry-specific skills to their workers and directors. While 
companies domiciled in LMEs are focused on satisfying the needs of shareholders, companies 
in CMEs are more interested in safeguarding the interests of stakeholders. This could also 
explain why companies operating in CMEs tend to have boards with more specific skills 
(such as an industry-specific background) because with these specific skills they will be more 
likely to satisfy stakeholders’ needs and demands.  
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Model 3 explored whether the proportion of female directors on boards was higher in 
LMEs than in CMEs. This variable had a positive sign, as expected, and is statistically 
significant, supporting the third hypothesis. Thus, we cannot reject the third hypothesis. This 
finding indicates that companies operating in LMEs have more women directors on boards 
than those operating in CMEs, consistent with Mandel and Semyonov (2006) and Grosvold 
and Brammer (2011). The significant increase in the success and advancement of female 
directors in positions of responsibility in LMEs (in comparison to other economies) may 
explain this result. Furthermore, Mandel and Shalev (2009) take into account varieties of 
capitalism in order to analyse the best position of female directors in LMEs, and suggest that 
LMEs implement a neutral position in the determination of roles in the labour market and the 
division of responsibilities in relation to the work-family dichotomy. 
In Model 4, the aim was to explore whether the presence of corporate governance 
committees is higher in LMEs than in CMEs. The coefficient was positive, as predicted, and 
significant, so the fourth hypothesis cannot be rejected. This evidence confirms that 
companies operating in LMEs are more likely to create a corporate governance committee 
than companies domiciled in CMEs. Thus, these results are consistent with the findings of 
Chizema and Shinozawa (2012), who report that the presence of corporate committees is 
more usual in LMEs, where the corporate governance style is oriented toward the shareholder 
value model (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003; Yoshikawa et al., 2007). This result can be 
explained because the presence of corporate governance committees improves the behaviour 
of boards, strengthening the protection of shareholders’ interests, which is a relevant attribute 
of LMEs. 
Regarding control variables, CEO power was only positive and statistically significant 
for Model 2, where the percentage of board members with an industry-specific background is 
the dependent variable. The leverage variable was significant and negatively correlated with 
CSR disclosure, not affecting all the other dependent variables. Finally, companies operating 
in commodities, consumer cyclical, energy, and industrial and utility sectors were negative 
and significantly correlated with the presence of female directors on boards. None of the other 
control variables was statistically significant.  
 
4.3 Robustness analysis  
 In Table 7, we perform a robustness analysis by estimating the models with panel data 
firm fixed-effects. With this estimator, we control unobserved firm fixed-effects, namely, 
unobserved time-constant firm heterogeneity (Desender and Epure, 2015). Furthermore, we 
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have also controlled for time fixed-effects by taking into account year dummy variables to 
address the potential endogeneity associated with the variations in our dependent variables in 
all companies. Table 7 shows that the first hypothesis is rejected, and the second, third and 
fourth ones are accepted, in line with the findings provided by the GMM procedure. We reach 
the same conclusions estimating the models with GMM and with firm fixed-effects 
estimators.  
 
5. Discussion and conclusions 
This research contributes to prior literature on the influence of different institutional 
contexts with regard to specific corporate governance attributes: CSR disclosure, board-
specific skills, female directors on corporate boards, and corporate governance committees. 
We have taken as our reference the varieties of capitalism perspective, which has scarcely 
been used in previous research (Jackson and Apostolakou, 2010), to explain the variations and 
changes that exist within capitalist systems through a broad dichotomy of institutional 
contexts in LMEs and CMEs (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Hancke et al., 2007; Vitols 2001; Hall 
and Gingerich, 2009). The main emphasis of the research in this field has focused on the 
distinctive nature of the institutional contexts in which companies operate, based on indexes 
such as the legal system and government, sources of financing and skills, educational systems, 
the influence of other social networks, and factors such as unions and regulatory authorities. 
The paper’s initial focus was that the institutional contexts for LMEs and CMEs can 
affect different aspects of corporate governance in different ways within the framework of 
varieties of capitalism, because as Aguilera and Jackson (2010) suggest, organisations 
operating under the same institutional context are pressured to behave similarly. This leads to 
companies belonging to specific contexts being homogeneous and adopting the same model 
of corporate governance. 
Next, we consider the four hypotheses proposed in the study. The first states that CSR 
reporting is lower in LME countries than in CME countries. This is rejected because the 
findings show—contrary to our predictions—that companies located in LME countries have 
the same probability of reporting CSR issues as companies operating in CME countries. The 
second hypothesis argues that board-specific skills are higher in CME countries than in LME 
countries, which is accepted. Our results therefore suggest that in CME contexts, the labour 
market is less flexible than in LME countries, unions are stronger, and employment protection 
is higher, which result in training programmes that are more relevant to workers. Board 
directors will provide these specific skills, and allow companies to satisfy stakeholders’ 
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interests better because CME countries are more oriented towards stakeholders than 
shareholders. The third hypothesis, which posits that the proportion of female directors on 
boards is higher in LMEs than in CMEs, is accepted. This may be because the progress of 
women in management positions and board directorships has been greater in LMEs such as 
the US (Mandel and Semyonov, 2006). In this type of countries, women are freer to compete 
with men for the highest positions, and this makes women achieve more relevant positions 
within boards in the institutional environment of LMEs. The non-rejection of the fourth 
hypothesis allows us to conclude that the existence of corporate governance committees is 
higher in LMEs than in CMEs. This result can be explained (as supported by Chizema and 
Shinozawa, 2012) because the existence of committees is a common practice in English-
speaking countries, within their style of corporate governance oriented toward the shareholder 
value model (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003; Yoshikawa et al., 2007). 
Thus, the results support the paper’s initial thesis that companies belonging to a 
specific context are homogeneous and adopt the same model of corporate governance. This 
evidence may be because different aspects of corporate governance were analysed within the 
framework of varieties of capitalism. 
This research also has practical implications. Firstly, with regard to managerial 
implications, our findings suggest that belonging to a specific variety of capitalism affects 
various mechanisms of corporate governance. Hence, these findings may have implications 
for managers when deciding which country to invest in, depending on the firms’ corporate 
governance structure. In this regard, if they do so in an LME country, the structure of 
corporate governance is determined by a high proportion of women directors on boards, and 
boards characterised by having corporate governance committees, which are mechanisms of 
vital importance for ensuring the board fulfils its duties. However, boards in these countries 
will have directors with general skills in comparison to CME countries, where board members 
are characterised by having specific skills, such as an industry-specific background. 
Concerning CSR disclosure, it does not matter whether firms operate in LME or CME 
contexts because there is no difference between them in relation to the reporting of CSR 
information. Managers in both types of countries will be able to find firms disclosing similar 
CSR matters. Secondly, our findings concerning the incorporation of female directors on 
corporate boards may be useful for policymakers, regulators, and corporate decision-makers. 
Our results suggest that the proportion of women directors is higher in LMEs than CMEs. In 
countries such as Norway and Spain, for instance (more oriented to a CME), initiatives have 
been implemented to increase the presence of female directors on boards. However, according 
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to our evidence, it would appear that these initiatives have not been as effective as expected. 
Thus, policymakers in countries domiciled in CME countries should complement these 
initiatives with other policies or measures that are more effective at increasing the presence of 
women directors on boards, given the benefits of the female leadership style in the decision-
making process (Pucheta-Martínez et al., 2018).  
As a final observation, this paper has a number of limitations. Firstly, it is possible that 
all the factors affecting our dependent variables, according to theory and empirical evidence, 
have not been controlled. Secondly, some control variables used in this research (such as CEO 
power) have been measured by focusing on past research, but it is also possible to measure 
this variable in another way. Finally, our study is based on a particular period, and so our 
evidence should not be extended to other periods.  
Our study offers several potential research opportunities. On the one hand, it would be 
interesting to explore other board attributes, such as the role of executive and institutional 
directors in LMEs. This new evidence would extend our conclusions. Conversely, future 
research might explore in more detail how board characteristics in countries operating in 
CMEs might improve the effectiveness of corporate governance. 
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Table 1 
Number of observations by country 
Country  Observations Percentage Cum. 
Australia  793 7.9 7.9 
Austria 34 0.3 8.2 
Belgium 90 0.9 9.1 
Canada  1125 11.2 20.3 
Denmark 110 1.1 21.4 
Finland 137 1.4 22.8 
Germany 357 3.6 26.3 
Ireland 174 1.7 28.1 
Japan 1515 15.1 43.2 
Netherlands 218 2.2 45.3 
New Zealand 52 0.5 45.9 
Norway  61 0.6 46.5 
Sweden  218 2.2 48.6 
Switzerland  380 3.8 52.4 
United Kingdom  1198 11.9 64.3 
United States  3581 35.7 100.0 
Total  10,043 100  
 
Table 2 
Number of observations by activity sector 
 
TRBC economic sector name Number of observations Percentage Cum. 
Basic Materials 1381 13.8 13.8 
Consumer cyclical, 2001 19.9 33.7 
Consumer Non-Cyclical 1002 10.0 43.7 
Energy 870 8.7 52.3 
Healthcare 896 8.9 61.2 
Industrial 2174 21.6 82.9 
Technology 877 8.7 91.6 
Telecommunications Services 331 3.3 94.9 
Utilities 511 5.1 100.0 
Total 10,043 100.0  
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Table 3 
Variables description 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables Description 
CSR_DISC The aggregation of 112 items concerning social and environmental issues 
B_SPECI_SKILLS The percentage of board members who have an industry-specific background 
WBOARD The proportion of female directors on boards= Total number of female directors on 
boards/Total number of directors on boards 
CG_COMMT Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm has a Corporate Governance 
Committee and 0, otherwise 
LME Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the country operates in a liberal market 
economy and 0, if the country operates in a coordinated market economy 
BODSIZE The total number of directors on boards 
Q_TOBIN The market capitalization of common stock+ book value liabilities divided by the book 
value of total assets 
CEO_POW The aggregation of four dummies variables: (1) Ceo duality,which is a dummy variable 
that takes the value 1 if the same person serves simultaneously as CEO and chairman of 
the board and 0, otherwise, (2) the Chairman of the board is ex-CEO, which is a dummy 
variable that takes the value 1 if the chairman of the board held the CEO position in the 
company prior to becoming chairman and 0, otherwise, (3) CEO tenure, which is a 
dummy variable that takes the value 1 if CEO tenure is above the sample median and 0, 
otherwise and (4) CEO board member, which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 
if the CEO serves as a board member, but not as chair of the board and 0, otherwise 
SIZE The log of total sales 
LEVERAGE Debt over total assets 
BASIC MATERIALS Dummy variable: 1= Basic Materials; 0 = Otherwise 
CONSUMER CYCLICAL Dummy variable: 1= Consumer Cyclical; 0 = Otherwise 
CONSUMER NON-
CYCLICAL 
Dummy variable: 1= Consumer Non-Cyclical; 0 = Otherwise 
ENERGY Dummy variable: 1= Energy; 0 = Otherwise 
HEALTHCARE Dummy variable: 1= Healthcare; 0 = Otherwise 
INDUSTRIALS Dummy variable: 1= Industrial; 0 = Otherwise 
TECHNOLOGY Dummy variable: 1= Technology; 0 = Otherwise 
TELECOMMUNICATION 
SERVICES 
Dummy variable: 1= Telecommunication Services; 0 = Otherwise 
UTILITIES Dummy variable: 1= Utilities; 0 = Otherwise 
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Table 4 
Descriptive analysis 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. p25 p50 p75 
CSR_DISC 10,043 28.082 17.801 12.000 27.000 42.000 
B_SPECI_SKILLS 10,043 57.897 23.875 41.667 57.143 75.000 
WBOARD 10,043 12.498 10.981 0.000 11.111 20.000 
CG_COMMT 10,043 53.430 49.884 0.000 1.000 1.000 
LME 10,043 70.168 45.754 0.000 1.000 1.000 
BODSIZE 10,043 10.439 3.249 8.000 10.000 12.000 
Q_TOBIN 10,043 0.712 0.255 0.551 0.682 0.836 
CEO_POW 10,043 1.643 0.740 1.000 2.000 2.000 
SIZE 10,043 9.610 1.433 9.350 9.756 10.206 
LEVERAGE 10,043 11.05 61.25 2.570 5.520 1.040 
BASIC MATERIALS 10,043 13.751 34.440 0.000 0.000 0.000 
CONSUMER CYCLICAL 10,043 19.924 39.945 0.000 0.000 0.000 
CONSUMER NON-CYCLICAL 10,043 9.977 29.970 0.000 0.000 0.000 
ENERGY 10,043 8.663 28.130 0.000 0.000 0.000 
HEALTHCARE 10,043 8.922 28.507 0.000 0.000 0.000 
INDUSTRIALS 10,043 21.647 41.186 0.000 0.000 0.000 
TECHNOLOGY 10,043 8.732 28.232 0.000 0.000 0.000 
TELECOMMUNICATION SERVICES 10,043 3.296 17.854 0.000 0.000 0.000 
UTILITIES 10,043 5.089 21.977 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Mean, standard deviation and percentiles. CSR_DISC is calculated as the aggregation of 112 items concerning social and environmental 
issues; B_SPECI_SKILLS is mesuread as the percentage of board members who have an industry-specific background; WBOARD is 
calculated as the proportion of female directors on boards; CG_COMMT is calculated as dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm 
has a Corporate Governance Committee and 0, otherwise; LME is measured as a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the country 
operates in a liberal market economy and 0, if the country operates in a coordinated market economy; BODSIZE is the total number of 
directors on boards; Q_TOBIN is calculated as the market capitalization of common stock+ book value liabilities divided by the book value 
of total assets; CEO_POW is measured as the aggregation of four dummies variables: (1) Ceo duality,which is a dummy variable that takes 
the value 1 if the same person serves simultaneously as CEO and chairman of the board and 0, otherwise, (2) the Chairman of the board is 
ex-CEO, which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the chairman of the board held the CEO position in the company prior to 
becoming chairman and 0, otherwise, (3) CEO tenure, which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if CEO tenure is above the sample 
median and 0, otherwise and (4) CEO board member, which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the CEO serves as a board member, 
but not as chair of the board and 0, otherwise; SIZE is the log of total sales; LEVERAGE is the debt over total assets; BASIC MATERIALS 
if the company operates in Basic Materials sector and 0, otherwise; CONSUMER CYCLICALS if the company operates in Consumer 
Cyclicals sector and 0, otherwise; CONSUMER NON-CYCLICALS if the company operates in Consumer Non-Cyclicals sector and 0, 
otherwise; ENERGY if the company operates in Energy sector and 0, otherwise; HEALTHCARE if the company operates in Healthcare 
sector and 0, otherwise; INDUSTRIALS if the company operates in Industrials sector and 0, otherwise; TECHNOLOGY if the company 
operates in Technology sector and 0, otherwise; TELECOMMUNICATION SERVICES if the company operates in Telecommunication 
Services sector and 0, otherwise; UTILITIES if the company operates in Utilities sector and 0, otherwise. 
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Table 5 
Correlation matrix 
 
Correlation matrix. CSR_DISC is calculated as the aggregation of 112 items concerning social and environmental issues; B_SPECI_SKILLS is mesuread as the percentage of board members who have an industry-
specific background; WBOARD is calculated as the proportion of female directors on boards; CG_COMMT is calculated as dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm has a Corporate Governance Committee 
and 0, otherwise; LME is measured as a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the country operates in a liberal market economy and 0, if the country operates in a coordinated market economy; BODSIZE is the total 
number of directors on boards; Q_TOBIN is calculated as the market capitalization of common stock+ book value liabilities divided by the book value of total assets; CEO_POW is measured as the aggregation of four 
dummies variables: (1) Ceo duality,which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the same person serves simultaneously as CEO and chairman of the board and 0, otherwise, (2) the Chairman of the board is ex-
CEO, which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the chairman of the board held the CEO position in the company prior to becoming chairman and 0, otherwise, (3) CEO tenure, which is a dummy variable that 
takes the value 1 if CEO tenure is above the sample median and 0, otherwise and (4) CEO board member, which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the CEO serves as a board member, but not as chair of the 
board and 0, otherwise; SIZE is the log of total sales; LEVERAGE is the debt over total assets; BASIC MATERIALS if the company operates in Basic Materials sector and 0, otherwise; CONSUMER CYCLICALS if 
the company operates in Consumer Cyclicals sector and 0, otherwise; CONSUMER NON-CYCLICALS if the company operates in Consumer Non-Cyclicals sector and 0, otherwise; ENERGY if the company operates 
 VIF (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
CSR_DISC (1) 1.41 1                  
B_SPECI_SKILLS (2) 1.13 -0.126*** 1                 
WBOARD (3) 1.28 0.207*** -0.310*** 1                
CG_COMMT (4) 1.64 -0.119*** -0.092*** 0.244*** 1               
LME (5) 1.77 -0.248*** -0.075*** 0.263*** 0.540*** 1              
BODSIZE (6) 1.27 0.356*** -0.132*** 0.135*** 0.144*** -0.061*** 1             
SIZE (7) 1.12 0.550*** 0.128*** 0.143*** 0.124*** -0.149*** 0.550*** 1            
Q_TOBIN (8) 1.11 0.000 -0.042*** 0.031** -0.206*** 0.028* -0.030* -0.024** 1           
CEO_POW (9) 1.11 0.082*** 0.044*** -0.021 0.091 0.264*** -0.008 -0.035*** 0.027*** 1          
LEVERAGE (10) 1.01 0.142*** -0.090*** 0.070*** -0.023** -0.042*** 0.182*** 0.278*** 0.689*** -0.028* 1         
BASIC MATERIALS (11) 2.00 0.046*** -0.003 -0.087*** -0.070*** -0.022** -0.069*** -0.065*** -0.049*** -0.035*** -0.054*** 1        
CONSUMER CYCLICAL (12) 2.71 -0.076*** -0.029** 0.036*** -0.032*** 0.050*** -0.008 -0.071*** 0.016 0.032** -0.020** -0.199*** 1       
CONSUMER NON-
CYCLICAL (13) 
1.51 0.095*** -0.074*** 0.145*** -0.002*** 0.025** 0.082*** 0.048*** 0.049*** -0.002 0.074*** -0.133*** -0.166*** 1      
ENERGY(14) 1.41 -0.097*** 0.092*** -0.060*** 0.158*** 0.116*** -0.034*** 0.037*** -0.148*** -0.049*** -0.090*** -0.123*** -0.154*** -0.103*** 1     
HEALTHCARE (15) 1.39 -0.043*** -0.021** 0.037*** 0.037*** -0.026*** -0.057*** -0.051*** -0.131*** 0.013 -0.089*** -0.125*** -0.156*** 0.104*** -0.096*** 1    
INDUSTRIALS(16)  2.83 0.031** 0.005 -0.107*** -0.139*** -0.129*** 0.041*** 0.006 0.171*** 0.025** 0.111*** -0.210*** -0.262*** -0.175*** -0.162*** -0.164*** 1   
TECHNOLOGY(17) 1.38 0.005 0.097*** -0.036*** 0.074*** -0.022** 0.074*** -0.049*** -0.137*** 0.049*** -0.221*** -0.124*** -0.154*** -0.103*** -0.095*** -0.097*** -0.163*** 1  
TELECOMMUNICATION 
SERVICES (18) 
5.37 0.010 -0.018* 0.058*** 0.000 -0.019** 0.055*** 0.0963*** 0.079*** -0.048*** 0.113*** -0.0734*** -0.092*** -0.062*** -0.057*** -0.058*** -0.097*** -0.057*** 1 
UTILITIES (19) 8.36 0.045*** -0.056*** 0.101*** 0.087*** 0.082*** 0.102*** 0.157*** 0.133*** -0.023** 0.236*** -0.092*** -0.116*** -0.077*** -0.071*** -0.073*** -0.122*** -0.072*** -0.043*** 
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in Energy sector and 0, otherwise; HEALTHCARE if the company operates in Healthcare sector and 0, otherwise; INDUSTRIALS if the company operates in Industrials sector and 0, otherwise; TECHNOLOGY if the 
company operates in Technology sector and 0, otherwise; TELECOMMUNICATION SERVICES if the company operates in Telecommunication Services sector and 0, otherwise; UTILITIES if the company operates 
in Utilities sector and 0, otherwise. *p-value<0.1 **p-value<0.05 ***p-value<0.01. 
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Table 6 
Results of the Generalized Method of Moments  
 MODEL 1 
D.V.= CSR_DISC 
Coef. 
(P.value) 
MODEL 2 
D.V.= B_SPECI_SKILLS 
Coef.  
(P.value) 
MODE 3 
D.V.= WBOARD 
Coef.  
(P.value) 
MODEL 4 
D.V.= CG_COMMT 
Coef.  
(P.value) 
CSR_DIS(t-1) 0.152 
(0.795) 
   
B_SPECI_SKILLS (t-1)  0.273*** 
(0.000) 
  
WBOARD (t-1)   0.750*** 
(0.000) 
 
CG_COMMT (t-1)    0.706*** 
(0.000) 
LME 54.258  
(0.158) 
-38.127** 
(0.030) 
7.052** 
(0.028) 
0.358*** 
(0.004) 
BODSIZE 2.628 
(0.227) 
-2.104 
(0.570) 
-0.137 
(0.821) 
-0.002 
(0.871) 
Q_TOBIN -2.039  
(0.796) 
-33.371 
(0.214) 
-3.137 
(0.376) 
0.215  
(0.104) 
CEO_POW 2.471  
(0.369) 
8.412* 
(0.065) 
1.437 
(0.186) 
0.034 
(0.479) 
SIZE 2.506  
(0.190) 
1.901 
(0.738) 
0.080 
(0.610) 
0.015 
(0.755) 
LEVERAGE -0.008* 
(0.050) 
-0.001 
(0.977) 
0.001 
(0.762) 
0.000 
(0.703) 
BASIC MATERIALS 206.138  
(0.440) 
-109.526 
(0.248) 
-2.713*  
(0.066) 
-0.018  
(0.764) 
CONSUMER CYCLICAL 194.337 
(0.474) 
-106.021 
(0.264) 
-2.547** 
(0.049) 
-0.023 
(0.694) 
CONSUMER NON-CYCLICAL 262.258 
(0.388) 
-107.675 
(0.256) 
-1.117 
(0.273) 
-0.023  
(0.629) 
ENERGY 60.150 
(0.780) 
-101.751 
(0.292) 
-4.270** 
(0.036) 
0.026 
(0.659) 
HEALTHCARE 81.403 
(0.740) 
-114.196 
(0.237) 
-1.988 
(0.247) 
0.059 
(0.347) 
INDUSTRIALS 237.583 
(0.531) 
-113.499 
(0.233) 
-1.986** 
(0.039) 
-0.015 
(0.749) 
TECHNOLOGY 214.382 
(0.546) 
-121.789 
(0.288) 
-2.729 
(0.132) 
0.070 
(0.224) 
UTILITIES -82.420 -124.316 -2.074* -0.024  
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(0.603) (0.419) (0.083) (0.564) 
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arellano-Bond test AR(1) (z, p>|z|) -3.51 (0.000) -7.12 (0.000) -15.58 (0.000) -4.69 (0.000) 
Arellano-Bond test AR(2) (z, p>|z|) 0.44 (0.663) -0.05 (0.961) 0.38 (0.700) -1.33 (0.182) 
Hansen test (Chi-square, p>|Chi2|) 20.27 (0.208) 18.80 (0.101) 18.49 (0.358) 14.04 (0.596) 
Number of instrumental variables 41 37 42 41 
Observations 8,496 7,803 8,496 8,496 
All models have been estimated by two-step and system GMM estimator with robust standard errors. CSR_DISC is calculated as the aggregation of 112 items concerning social and environmental issues; 
B_SPECI_SKILLS is mesuread as the percentage of board members who have an industry-specific background; WBOARD is calculated as the proportion of female directors on boards; CG_COMMT is calculated as 
dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm has a Corporate Governance Committee and 0, otherwise; LME is measured as a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the country operates in a liberal market 
economy and 0, if the country operates in a coordinated market economy; BODSIZE is the total number of directors on boards; Q_TOBIN is calculated as the market capitalization of common stock+ book value 
liabilities divided by the book value of total assets; CEO_POW is measured as the aggregation of four dummies variables: (1) Ceo duality,which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the same person serves 
simultaneously as CEO and chairman of the board and 0, otherwise, (2) the Chairman of the board is ex-CEO, which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the chairman of the board held the CEO position in the 
company prior to becoming chairman and 0, otherwise, (3) CEO tenure, which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if CEO tenure is above the sample median and 0, otherwise and (4) CEO board member, which 
is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the CEO serves as a board member, but not as chair of the board and 0, otherwise; SIZE is the log of total sales; LEVERAGE is the debt over total assets; BASIC 
MATERIALS if the company operates in Basic Materials sector and 0, otherwise; CONSUMER CYCLICALS if the company operates in Consumer Cyclicals sector and 0, otherwise; CONSUMER NON-CYCLICALS 
if the company operates in Consumer Non-Cyclicals sector and 0, otherwise; ENERGY if the company operates in Energy sector and 0, otherwise; HEALTHCARE if the company operates in Healthcare sector and 0, 
otherwise; INDUSTRIALS if the company operates in Industrials sector and 0, otherwise; TECHNOLOGY if the company operates in Technology sector and 0, otherwise; TELECOMMUNICATION SERVICES if the 
company operates in Telecommunication Services sector and 0, otherwise; UTILITIES if the company operates in Utilities sector and 0, otherwise. D.V.= Dependent variable. *p-value<0.1 **p-value<0.05 ***p-
value<0.01. 
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Table 7 
Results of the firm fixed-effects panel data regressions 
 MODEL 1 
D.V.=CSR_DISC 
Coef. 
(P.value) 
MODEL 2 
D.V.=B_SPECI_SKI
LLS 
Coef. 
(P.value) 
MODE 3 
D.V.= 
WBOARD 
Coef. 
(P.value) 
MODEL 4 
D.V.=CG_COM
MT 
Coef.  
(P.value) 
LME 0.012 
(0.900) 
-0.431* 
(0.085) 
0.246*** 
(0.007) 
0.007*** 
(0.001) 
BODSIZE 0.103* 
(0.096) 
-0.303* 
(0.099) 
-0.023 
(0.701) 
0.003** 
(0.010) 
Q_TOBIN 0.217 
(0.219) 
1.049 
(0.217) 
-0.209 
(0.159) 
0.007 
(0.130) 
CEO_POW -0.204 
(0.501) 
0.855 
(0.261) 
-0.090 
(0.727) 
-0.011 
(0.153) 
SIZE 0.024 
(0.612) 
0.124 
(0.427) 
-0.062 
(0.160) 
0.015 
(0.407) 
LEVERAGE -0.000 
(0.542) 
-0.000 
(0.627) 
0.000 
(0.183) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
BASIC MATERIALS 0.199 
(0.200) 
0.418 
(0.242) 
0.183 
(0.181) 
0.007* 
(0.067) 
CONSUMER CYCLICAL -0.355** 
(0.010) 
-0.065 
(0.843) 
-0.207* 
(0.080) 
0.003 
(0.184) 
CONSUMER NON-
CYCLICAL 
0.297* 
(0.097) 
-0.562 
(0.153) 
0.105 
(0.522) 
0.002 
(0.550) 
ENERGY -0.543*** 
(0.002) 
-0.718* 
(0.064) 
-0.108 
(0.447) 
-0.006 
(0.162) 
HEALTHCARE -0.027 
(0.871) 
-0.654 
(0.102) 
-0.039 
(0.812) 
0.009** 
(0.025) 
INDUSTRIALS 0.113 
(0.602) 
-0.691 
(0.430) 
0.311 
(0.222) 
0.011 
(0.120) 
TECHNOLOGY -0.059 
(0.734) 
-0.503 
(0.109) 
-0.024 
(0.876) 
0.002 
(0.424) 
UTILITIES -.457** 
(0.026) 
0.211 
(0.641) 
-0.040*** 
(0.000) 
-0.002 
(0.353) 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 68.88% 4.51% 21.48%  3.06 % 
Observations 10,043 10,043 10,043 10,043 
All models have been estimated with robust standard errors. CSR_DISC is calculated as the aggregation of 112 items concerning social and 
environmental issues; B_SPECI_SKILLS is mesuread as the percentage of board members who have an industry-specific background; 
WBOARD is calculated as the proportion of female directors on boards; CG_COMMT is calculated as dummy variable that takes the value 1 
if the firm has a Corporate Governance Committee and 0, otherwise; LME is measured as a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the 
country operates in a liberal market economy and 0, if the country operates in a coordinated market economy; BODSIZE is the total number 
of directors on boards; Q_TOBIN is calculated as the market capitalization of common stock+ book value liabilities divided by the book 
value of total assets; CEO_POW is measured as the aggregation of four dummies variables: (1) Ceo duality,which is a dummy variable that 
takes the value 1 if the same person serves simultaneously as CEO and chairman of the board and 0, otherwise, (2) the Chairman of the board 
is ex-CEO, which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the chairman of the board held the CEO position in the company prior to 
becoming chairman and 0, otherwise, (3) CEO tenure, which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if CEO tenure is above the sample 
median and 0, otherwise and (4) CEO board member, which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the CEO serves as a board member, 
but not as chair of the board and 0, otherwise; SIZE is the log of total sales; LEVERAGE is the debt over total assets; BASIC MATERIALS 
if the company operates in Basic Materials sector and 0, otherwise; CONSUMER CYCLICALS if the company operates in Consumer 
Cyclicals sector and 0, otherwise; CONSUMER NON-CYCLICALS if the company operates in Consumer Non-Cyclicals sector and 0, 
otherwise; ENERGY if the company operates in Energy sector and 0, otherwise; HEALTHCARE if the company operates in Healthcare 
sector and 0, otherwise; INDUSTRIALS if the company operates in Industrials sector and 0, otherwise; TECHNOLOGY if the company 
operates in Technology sector and 0, otherwise; TELECOMMUNICATION SERVICES if the company operates in Telecommunication 
Services sector and 0, otherwise; UTILITIES if the company operates in Utilities sector and 0, otherwise. D.V.= Dependent variable. *p-
value<0.1 **p-value<0.05 ***p-value<0.01. 
 
 
 
